Obama drone strikes3/2/2023 ![]() “ The Changing Role of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the 1970s and 1980s.” Congress & the Presidency 12 (1): 1– 20. ).ģ See McCormick’s ( 1985 McCormick, James M. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. The result is a diffusion among civilian principals that complicates effective control of agents, such as the CIA and the military (Feaver 2005 Feaver, Peter D. “ Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Is the Solution Part of the Problem?” Intelligence and National Security 25 (1): 24– 49. Consequently, numerous members of Congress have access to some information about sensitive intelligence operations, but no single member reviews the administration’s entire program (see Lowenthal 2017 Lowenthal, Mark M. , 6).Ģ Fragmentation in this area stems from the fact that a number of congressional committees play a role in overseeing intelligence activities. Our study thus contends that congressional entrepreneurs played a key role for both change and continuity regarding drone warfare oversight.ġ Bin Ali Jaber v. At the same time, further limitations, most notably to consolidate drone strike oversight by ending the CIA drone program, were defeated by senior leaders in Congress. Congress enacted limited changes to drone strike oversight and pressured President Obama to increase transparency. ![]() We apply the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) to conduct an interpretive case study and shed light on our central research question: How can we explain the timing and limited extent of changes with regard to congressional oversight of drone strikes during the Obama presidency? While this policy area is traditionally depicted as one of executive dominance and legislative acquiescence, we analyze how congressional entrepreneurs used a policy window in the wake of John Brennan’s confirmation hearings for CIA Director in 2013 to set the agenda on congressional oversight of drone strikes, and thereby contest executive policy-making. Our article contributes to filling this gap and focuses on the politics of congressional oversight of drone warfare-in particular those operations conducted by the CIA (Title 50 operations) during the Obama administration. Despite the increasing use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in counter-terror operations, executive-legislative relations, intelligence oversight, and war powers regarding drone strikes have received scarce scholarly interest. ![]()
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